This paper studies the steady state and dynamic consequences of in ‡ation in an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy. It is found that 10 percentage points of in ‡ation entails a steady state welfare cost as high as 13 % of annual consumption. This large cost is mainly driven by staggered price contracts and price indexation. The transition from high to low in ‡ation in ‡icts a welfare loss equivalent to 0.53%. The role of nominal/real frictions as well as that of parameter uncertainty is also addressed.
Introduction
Undoubtedly, the period 1990-2006 will be remembered as one of relative prosperity in the U.S., characterized by high growth and low and stable in ‡ation. Output, for example, averaged an annual growth rate of 3% while the mean annual CPI in ‡ation was 3%, for that period. Yet recent developments in international commodity and …nancial markets have induced substantial level changes on in ‡ation. Indeed, annualized CPI in ‡ation in the U.S. was close to 6% in July 2008, a level not seeing seen since the early 1990s. 1 Although in ‡ation has subsequently retreated, the low fed funds rate of recent months has sparked renewed interest among economic observers, who argue that in ‡ation may be back sooner than expected. It is unlikely that we will reach the in ‡ation rates of the 1970s, but these variations in prices invite us to revisit some old questions: What are the welfare consequences of in ‡ation? And more important, how much would society willingly sacri…ce to avoid, say, 10 percentage points of in ‡ation? This paper tries to answer these questions from the perspective of an estimated New Keynesian model. Evaluating the (unpleasant) impact of in ‡ation on society has been a recurrent topic in macroeconomics that can be traced back to the seminal contributions of Bailey (1956) and Friedman (1969) . This research agenda has typically pursued two distinct approaches. The …rst line follows Bailey (1956) in measuring the welfare cost of in ‡ation as the area under the money demand curve. Under this tradition, money is a special consumption good while in ‡ation is a direct tax on it. Hence, large in ‡ations are welfare reducing, since they make holding real balances costly. For example, Bailey established that a 10-percentage-point drop in steady state in ‡ation entails a welfare gain equivalent to 1% of annual income. Over the years, authors such as Lucas (1981, and 2000) , and Fischer (1981) have persistently found welfare estimates smaller than Bailey's. More recently, Ireland (2008) and Khan, King, and Wolman (2003) estimate the welfare cost to be as low as 0:20% and 0:05%, respectively.
The second strand of the literature has explored the cost of in ‡ation in a general equilibrium context. In these models in ‡ation is costly because households must divert productive time into leisure and …nancial activities aimed at saving on real cash balances (Ireland, 1997) . Cooley and Hansen (1989) and Burdick (1997) , for instance, …nd only modest gains (around 0:5%) of low in ‡ation in a highly stylized real business cycle model. Dotsey and Ireland (1996) study in ‡ation in a richer general equilibrium framework and report that an in ‡ation of 4 percentage points entails a welfare cost as high as 1% of annual output. Furthermore, Ireland (1997) shows that the presence of sticky price contracts only exacerbates the neg-ative consequences of in ‡ation. Finally, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004 and 2005) explore the optimal in ‡ation rate in fully ‡edged DSGE models.
The contribution of this paper falls within the second line of research. Speci…cally, I study the welfare implications of in ‡ation by employing a fairly standard DSGE model, entertaining features such as price/wage sluggishness, habit formation, and costly adjustment of investment. The proposed model borrows concepts from Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2005, henceforth ACEL) and the important contribution of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005, henceforth CEE). The presence of real and nominal frictions gives the model a more realistic ‡avor and facilitates comparisons between the predictions of the medium scale New Keynesian models with those from more parsimonious formulations, e.g., Dotsey and Ireland (1996) and Ireland (1997) . As will become clear, the predictions from the two setups can be quite di¤erent.
When deciding how much in real balances to keep, households confront two tensions in the model. They enjoy utility from directly holding positive money balances as in Sidrausky (1967) . However, each dollar kept for utility purposes forgoes a positive return that would be earned if deposited in a …nancial intermediary. This dual role of money gives rise to a wellde…ned money demand function as in Khan et al. (2003) . This money demand equation has two appealing properties: 1) it is well suited for estimation, and 2) it allows us to evaluate the taxational aspect of in ‡ation as in Bailey (1956) . Of course, Sidrausky's method is only one of many ways to justify the presence of money in the economy. For example, Cooley and Hansen (1989) propose a cash-in-advance formulation to analyze the implications of in ‡ation. More recently, Aruoba and Schorfheide (2008) study welfare and prices using a search-based model of money balances.
Studying the cost of in ‡ation in an estimated DSGE model poses some interesting challenges. To begin with, ACEL and CEE estimate a small interest rate semi-elasticity of the demand for money, which seems necessary to properly account for the high frequency properties of the data. However, Lucas (1981 and 2000) argues that the long-run semi-elasticity is the right choice for welfare analysis.
2 Hence I propose a ‡exible money demand formulation, which can simultaneously capture the short-and long-run properties of money demand. The key ingredient in this formulation is that re-balancing the composition of money balances for utility purposes or for bank deposits is costly. To capture this cost, the model assumes that households use time-dependent rules to re-optimize their money holdings. The presence of those costs in turn implies that households look forward when re-balancing their portfolios between cash and deposits.
Even though the model gives rise to a rich dynamic money demand equation, minimumdistance estimators tend to recover the short-run properties of the data, resulting in the small elasticities reported in the literature (ACEL, and CEE). Therefore, the model is estimated using Bayesian methods similar to those applied in Schorfheide (2000) and Smets and Wouters (2007) . This approach has the advantage that priors can be used to simultaneously recover the short-and long-run elasticities of the demand for money. Additionally, the Bayesian methodology allows us to assess the impact of parameter uncertainty in the welfare calculations. It will become clear that this type of uncertainty signi…cantly a¤ects the steady state welfare estimates.
In the benchmark formulation, which includes several nominal/real frictions, an annual in ‡ation of 10 percentage points entails a steady state welfare cost equivalent to around 13% of annual consumption or 6:5% when measured in annual output. This relatively large cost of in ‡ation mainly arises from staggered price contracts and price indexation, which induce signi…cant steady state price dispersion. Habit formation and the interest semi-elasticity of money demand also contribute to making in ‡ation costly, although to a lesser degree. For example, if money demand is relatively inelastic as in CEE, the steady state welfare cost drops to 9:5% of annual consumption. It is also shown that the central bank's response to in ‡ation in the Taylor rule has strong implications for welfare. A mild response, for instance, results into a smaller welfare cost of in ‡ation. Finally, the estimated model implies that Bailey's taxation aspect of in ‡ation imposes a welfare loss of about 1% of consumption, a result consistent with previous studies.
Following Ireland (1997) , the estimated model is used to evaluate the transitional costs of moving to a lower in ‡ation state. I …nd that this transition is welfare reducing, but it is only a small fraction of the bene…ts from living in a low in ‡ation environment. In fact, the transition amounts for a welfare loss of 0:53% of annual consumption in the benchmark speci…cation. The absence of sticky prices or habit formation makes the transition less costly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the baseline model, including the money demand formulation. I describe the estimation technique and report estimated parameters in section 3. The welfare analysis is presented in sections 4 and 5. Finally, section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
Model
The model builds on ACEL, CEE, and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005) . Since this type of environment has been extensively discussed in the literature, I provide a brief discussion, omitting lengthy derivations. The main features of the model can be summarized as follows:
The economy grows along a stochastic path; prices, wages, and money holdings are assumed to be sticky à la Calvo; preferences display external habit formation; investment adjustment is costly; and …nally, there are …ve sources of uncertainty: neutral and capital embodied technology shocks, preference, government, and monetary shocks.
Firms
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive …rms indexed by j 2 [0; 1], each producing a …nal good out of capital services, k j , and labor services, L j;t . The technology function is given by k j;t S L t L j;t 1 S t ; the term makes pro…ts equal to zero in the steady state. S t is the stochastic growth path of the economy (see below for its de…nition). 3 The neutral technology shock, S L t , grows at rate g L t , which is assumed to follow the process
where " g L ;t is distributed N(0; 1). Firms rent capital and labor in perfectly competitive factor markets. I assume that workers must be paid in advance. As a consequence, …rms must borrow the wage bill, W t L j;t , from a …nancial intermediary. The loan plus the interest rate, R t , must be repaid at the end of the period.
Firms choose prices to maximize the present value of pro…ts; prices are set in a Calvo fashion; that is, each period, …rms optimally revise their prices with an exogenous probability 1 p . If, instead, a …rm does not re-optimize its price, then the price is updated according to the rule: P j;t = ( t 1 ) P j;t 1 , where t 1 is the economy-wide in ‡ation in the previous period and 2 [0; 1]. By allowing partial indexation in the price rule, I follow the common practice in the literature (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2004, and Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez, 2008). An optimizing …rm at time t sets prices according to the program
Here, P t is the price index, y t (j) is the aggregate demand for good type j, mc t is …rm j's marginal cost, is the discount factor, and t is the marginal utility of consumption at time t.
3 The growth term is needed to have a well-de…ned steady state around which we can solve the model.
Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of households indexed by i. Every period households must decide how much to consume, work, and invest. In addition, they must choose the amount of money to be sent to a …nancial intermediary. I assume that agents in the economy have access to complete markets; such an assumption is needed to eliminate wealth di¤erentials arising from wage heterogeneity (CEE, and Erceg, Henderson, and Levin, 2000) . Households maximize the expected present discounted value of utility
subject to
Here, S U c is a preference shock that follows the process log S U c t = U c log S U c t 1 + U c " Uc;t with " Uc;t distributed N(0; 1); preferences display external habit formation, measured by b 2 (0; 1); and is a function re ‡ecting the costs associated with adjusting investment. This function is assumed to be increasing and convex satisfying = 0 = 0 and 00 > 0 in steady state. M i;t 1 is household i's beginning of period t stock of money, whereas T t is a lump-sum transfer by the government. Households send the amount M i;t 1 M i;t + T t to a …nancial intermediary where it earns the interest rate, R t . The stochastic trend,
in the money term is required to have a well-de…ned steady state. The term S K t is an investment-speci…c shock whose growth rate obeys
where " g K ;t is distributed N(0; 1). As in ACEL, CEE, and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), I assume that physical capital can be used at di¤erent intensities. Furthermore, using the capital with intensity x t entails a cost a(x t ), which satis…es a(1) = 0; a"(1) > 0; a 0 (1) > 0. For future reference, de…ne
The term A i;t captures net payments from complete markets and government bonds, and pro…ts from producers. The individual consumption good is assumed to be a composite made of di¤erentiated goods indexed by j according to the aggregator
where c(i; j) is the demand of household i for good type j. With this type of composite good, the demand for goods of type j is given by c(i; j) = P j;t Pt C i;t : Here, the nominal price index is
. Similarly, I assume that individual investment obeys
As with consumption, I(i; j) denotes household i's demand for investment good of type j.
Wage Setting
Following Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) , I assume that each household is a monopolistic supplier of a di¤erentiated labor service, L i;t . Households sell these labor services to a competitive …rm that aggregates labor and sell it to …nal …rms. The technology used by the aggregator is
It is straightforward to show that the relation between the labor aggregate and the wage aggregate, W t , is given by
To induce wage sluggishness, I assume that households set their wages in Calvo fashion. In particular, with exogenous probability w a household does not re-optimize wages each period. If this is the case, wages are set according to the rule of thumb W i;t = ( t 1 ) w W i;t 1 . Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2008), the wage rule allows for partial indexation with parameter w 2 [0; 1]: Similar to the …rms, households set wages according to the program
The marginal utility of consumption, , is not indexed by i, re ‡ecting our assumption of complete markets.
Demand for Money
As previously discussed, modeling money demand needs to account for two important regularities found in the literature. On the one hand, authors such as ACEL and CEE argue that in the context of DSGE models the short-run demand for money is what matters. In particular, they estimate an interest rate semi-elasticity of money demand around 1 (this …nding is robust across di¤erent econometric techniques). On the other hand, studies about the welfare implications of in ‡ation stress the importance of the long-run properties of money demand. For example, Lucas (2000) estimates that the long-run semi-elasticity of money demand lies between 5 and 7. Based on these numbers, he …nds the welfare costs of in ‡ation to be on the order of 1% of annual income. Furthermore, an extrapolation of his results implies that for a semi-elasticity of 1 the welfare cost is roughly 0.2%. This evidence raises the following dilemma: Too much elasticity delivers sizable welfare costs but worsens the short-run dynamics of money. Alternatively, low elasticities provide the right high frequency description of money at the expense of predicting too low welfare costs.
A simple yet formal way to solve the money demand dilemma is to assume time-dependent portfolio adjustment; i.e., agents re-optimize their money balances, M , infrequently, similar in spirit to the price-and wage-setting model of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). Speci…cally, a fraction, 1 m , of randomly chosen households is allowed to re-optimize their balances every period. As far as inactive households, the literature on portfolio choice provides little guidance regarding their behavior (Campbell and Viceira, 2002) . Hence, if a household is not allowed to re-optimize today, its money holdings are adjusted according to the rule M i;t = t 1 g t 1 M i:t 1 , where t 1 represents the last period in ‡ation, and g is the growth rate of the aggregate shock S . 4 This rule does not allow for partial indexation, since initial estimation attempts clearly showed that the indexation parameter was not identi…ed. As argued in Guerron-Quintana (2009), the sticky money assumption is likely to capture two important aspects of the economy. First, it proxies the degree of access to …nancial and banking services enjoyed by households. Prior to the widespread use of ATMs, electronic banking, and the branching liberalization of the 1980s, households spent an important amount of resources managing their accounts. Consequently, households had limited access to such services, which is parsimoniously captured in the model by infrequent portfolio re-balancing.
Second, the time-dependent assumption captures the costs faced by households when assessing the uncertainty surrounding the economy and the …nancial system. The presence of large costs makes it harder for households to determine the state of the economy and in particular the risk exposure of banks. As a consequence, households may opt to limit their participation in …nancial markets. We can also think of the portfolio friction as indirectly capturing the infrequent participation of trading agents in the equity market reported by Vissing-Jorgensen (2003). As before, I interpret this infrequent re-optimization as the result of costs faced by households. The basic idea is that in the presence of these costs, households fully optimize their portfolio only periodically and follow simple rules for changing their portfolio at other times.
The staggered money setting and the functional forms for the utility function imply that an optimizing (active) household at time t chooses money balances according to the program
As shown in the appendix, the solution to the previous program gives rise to a money demand for active households, which requires that the expected marginal bene…t of an extra dollar (enjoy additional utility) equals its expected marginal cost (forgone interest rate), i.e.,
where the terms x 1 m and x 2 m are given by
Here, M t is the money holdings optimally chosen by active households today. Equation (2) implies that the annualized short-and long-run semi-elasticities of money demand are given by
; and
respectively; here, R is the steady state quarterly interest rate (see the appendix for details). As long as m > 0, we see that the short-run elasticity is smaller than its long-term counterpart, jE SR j < jE LR j. Consequently, the curvature parameter, m , can be used to describe the money demand in the long run as required by welfare analysis. Furthermore, we can control the short-run dynamics of money via the sluggishness coe¢ cient, m . This ability to capture the short-and long-run properties of money through separate parameters is exploited in the estimation section.
Government
The monetary authority sets the quarterly interest rate according to a Taylor rule. In particular, the central bank smooths interest rates and responds to deviations of actual in ‡ation from steady state in ‡ation, , and deviations of output from its trend level, (Y =S ) t :
The term " m;t is a random shock to the systematic component of monetary policy and is assumed to be standard normal; m is the size of the monetary shock. Other authors have implemented similar Taylor rules, e.g., Del Negro et al. (2004) and Justiniano and Primiceri (2006) . As in the related literature (ACEL, and Levin et al., 2005) , it is assumed that the government has access to lump-sum taxes and debt. Furthermore, the government consumes a stochastic fraction of output G t = S g;t Y t (Justiniano and Primiceri, 2006) . The law of motion for S g is log S g;t = (1 g ) log S g + g log S g;t 1 + g " g;t , where " g;t has a standard normal distribution.
Financial Intermediaries
Financial intermediaries receive deposits from households in the amount
T t , which includes the monetary transfer T t from the government. All this money is lent to the good …rms so they can pay workers at the beginning of each period. Consequently, the clearing condition in the loan market is
Estimation
The data come from the Haver Analytics database and span 1984:I to 2004:IV. I opt for this short sample based on two observations. To begin with, Stock and Watson (2007) report that the stochastic process for in ‡ation changed around 1984. Second, Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007 and 2008) argue that either stochastic volatility or parameter drifting are essential features of any DSGE model to capture the pre-and post-1984 features of the data, i.e., to properly account for the Great Moderation. Since a central point in this paper is the implications of in ‡ation in recent years, introducing those features will only complicate the solution and estimation of the model without adding much substance to the subject. The model is estimated using eight U.S. variables: the growth rates of output, consumption, investment, real wages, and real money balances ( log Y t ; log C t ; log I t ; log (W=P ) t ; log (M=P ) t ), the level of labor, nominal interest rates, and in ‡ation (log L t ; i t ; t ). The series are built as follows: Real GDP per capita results from dividing nominal GDP by population and the GDP de ‡ator. Real consumption is the sum of personal consumption of non-durables and services. Real investment consists of personal consumption expenditures of durables and gross private domestic investment. Both real consumption and real investment are divided by population to obtain per capita measures. The log of hours of all persons in the non-farm business sector divided by population corresponds to labor in the paper. Real wages result from dividing nominal wage per hour in the non-farm business sector by the GDP de ‡ator. Interest rates correspond to the e¤ective federal funds rate while in ‡ation is the quarterly log di¤erence of the GDP de ‡ator.
CEE interpret the utility from money as capturing the transaction role of money. Furthermore, Feenstra (1986) argues that money in the utility function is equivalent to a formulation where money provides liquidity services. These interpretations point to seasonally adjusted M 1 as the relevant measure of money for estimation purposes. Speci…cally, the ratio M 1=P will be used as the counterpart of aggregate real balances in the model, M=P = R M i;t =P di. In results not reported here, I …nd that using M 2 minus and its own opportunity cost as measures of money and interest rates delivers similar implications. , the linearized version of the model is estimated using Bayesian methods. In particular, the posterior distribution of the structural parameters is characterized using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach (for details of this algorithm see the appendix and the excellent surveys of An and Schorfheide, 2007, and Geweke, 1999) . Since there are eight observable variables and only …ve structural shocks, I avoid stochastic singularity by following Sargent (1989) in including measurement errors to the state space representation used to estimate the model. 5 These errors are assumed to be iid and distributed N(0; ). The scale of these errors can vary across the measurement equations. The results in the next sections are based on a Markov chain of 150,000 draws after discarding 10,000 replications from a burn in phase.
Priors A subset of the parameter space was …xed: = 0:36; = 0:025; S g = 0:22. The steady state fraction S g was set to match the average share of government expenditure in output in the sample. Since steady state labor, L ss , is estimated, the parameter is endogenously determined.
Based on the discussion in Section 2.4, I set the priors for m and m to capture the short-and long-run elasticities of money demand (see Table 1 ). For the average annualized interest rate of 5:4% in the sample, the implied mean elasticities are roughly 6:25 and 12:5, respectively. The long-run value is consistent with the results in Mankiw and Summers (1986) and Ball (1998) . On the other hand, the short-run elasticity is large relative to ACEL and Christiano et al. (1999) . I choose to do so to keep symmetry among the sticky contract assumptions in the model. Notice that the price, wage, and money contracts share the same priors. As we will see in the next section, the money demand priors are not very informative in the sense that the inference approach uncovers distinct posteriors. From equation (3), it is clear that the parameters m and m completely characterize the dynamics of money demand; i.e., the data are silent about the remaining parameter in the money block, m . Hence, this parameter is set to the value chosen in CEE: 0:055.
The prior distributions for the remaining parameters are reported in Table 1 Table 2 reports the median estimates for the structural parameters in my formulation. Numbers in parenthesis correspond to the 5% and 95% percentiles for each parameter (a 90% probability interval). The absence of the price of investment as an observable variable implies that the two trends in the model, S L and S K , are not identi…ed separately. Therefore, the steady state growth rate of the investment-speci…c shock is set to one, g K = 1.
Median Estimates
Broadly speaking, the estimates are in line with the results previously found in the literature (CEE, and Smets and Wouters, 2007) . For example, the model displays signi…cant habit formation, around 0:93, and adjustment costs of investment on the order of 3:82. The habit formation estimate may seem high relative to that in ACEL; however, the estimate is perfectly in line with the …ndings in Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2008). The empirical results imply that prices and wages are re-optimized on average every 3 and 1:5 quarters, respectively. It is tempting to contrast the length of the price/wage contracts with the results in Nakamura and Steinnson (2008) and Bils and Klenow (2004) . Yet the presence of partial indexation makes such comparison unfeasible. The estimated Taylor rule implies that the central bank actively responds to in ‡ation and smooths interest rates with coe¢ cients similar to those found in Justiniano and Primiceri (2006) . In terms of the structural errors, I …nd that they display signi…cant serial correlation. The inference approach estimates a Frisch elasticity, , of 1:61, a value consistent with that reported in FernandezVillaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007), and Justiniano and Primiceri (2006) . When we turn to in ‡ation, we observe that the inference approach places its steady state value around 2%, which is close to the mean in ‡ation in the sample (2:3%).
The median estimates for the money demand coe¢ cients, m and m , are 1:85 and 0:86, respectively. The large value for the Calvo lottery in money re ‡ects the estimation's attempt to capture the high frequency properties of money. In fact, its implied short-run elasticity is 1:40; interestingly, CEE report a comparable estimate. On the other hand, the empirical results suggest a long-run elasticity of 10, which is well within the boundaries found in the literature (see Goldfeld and Sichel, 1990 ). 6 The estimates of m and m also indicate that the assumptions outlined in Section 2.4 are ‡exible enough to simultaneously capture the high and low frequency properties of money demand.
Welfare Cost of De ‡ations
In ‡ation is potentially welfare reducing in the model due to several factors. To begin with, the presence of money demand (equation 2) makes in ‡ation costly because of its tax implications as in Bailey (1956) . Indeed, low in ‡ation implies reduced nominal interest rates (Fisher, 1930) , which bene…ts households because consuming real balances becomes inexpensive. A second source of distortion in the economy is staggered price contracts. To see this point, note that, ignoring growth and capital utilization, aggregate output in the model is
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005) establish that s is bounded below by 1 and captures the degree of price dispersion in the economy. Staggered prices force optimizing …rms to heavily review their prices to keep up with in ‡ation, which induces dispersion, i.e., s >> 1. Large price stickiness (big ) or small price indexation (low ) exacerbates this dispersion, decreases aggregate output, and ultimately reduces welfare (see Section 5.1). Finally, costly investment adjustment and habit formation make consumption and investment decisions rel-atively in ‡exible in the short term. Such in ‡exibility may also amplify the e¤ects of in ‡ation, especially during the transition from high to low in ‡ation.
A simple way to capture the cost of in ‡ation is to measure households'dislike for highin ‡ation environments. Following Cooley and Hansen (1989), Ireland (1997) , and Lucas (2000) , let us de…ne the welfare cost of a high-in ‡ation regime, , as the fraction of consumption in the low-in ‡ation steady state that households are willing to give up to be indi¤erent between the low-and high-in ‡ation regimes. 7 To simplify the calculations below, the growth rate of the economy, g t = S t =S t 1 , is set to 1. This assumption is inconsequential for the rest of the analysis as I am solely interested in measuring the welfare costs under perfect foresight. De…ne the social utility function by
where, C, and L correspond to both aggregate and individual consumption, and labor. This is a direct consequence of the complete market assumption. For the money demand block, m and m are real balances chosen by active and inactive households, respectively (see Appendix A). The dynamic nature of the model allows us to distinguish two types of welfare costs: in steady state and during the transition. In the absence of uncertainty and using the functional forms given in Section 3, the social utility function in steady state collapses to
Here, the index i indicates whether we refer to the high-in ‡ation steady state (i = H), or the low-in ‡ation steady state (i = L). In addition, C i ; L i ; and m i correspond to the steady state consumption, labor, and real balances on regime i. The rule of thumb for money choices implies that households choose the same steady state money balances, i.e., m = m . With these de…nitions in place, the steady state welfare gain, ss , is given by
The second line is a consequence of the functional forms used in this paper. A positive ss indicates that households prefer the low-in ‡ation regime, i.e., they willingly give up consumption to avoid the high in ‡ation equilibrium. In other words, in ‡ation entails a steady state welfare loss if ss > 0.
As previously argued, nominal and real frictions can make painful the transition from high to low in ‡ation. To quantify their e¤ect on welfare, suppose as in Taylor (1983) and Ireland (1997) that the monetary authority fully commits to a new low-in ‡ation policy at time t = 0. In the model, such an exercise requires moving the target in ‡ation in the Taylor rule (4) from a high rate, H , to a new low in ‡ation L . Households and …rms observe this change and conclude that the interest rate in the old in ‡ationary regime is large relative to the new steady state. 8 This high interest rate in turn discourages economic activity, since it makes the wage bill (R t W t L t ) more expensive and consumption less attractive (it is more rewarding to send money to the bank). Therefore, from the point of view of the new low-in ‡ation regime, the old in ‡ationary steady state resembles the initial response of a contractionary monetary shock. It is precisely this contractionary aspect that makes the de ‡ationary path costly, i.e., households who live in a low-in ‡ation scenario are willing to sacri…ce consumption to avoid undertaking the transition. How painful this transition is depends, among other things, on the length of the sticky contracts, habit formation, and the shape of the Taylor rule. Let fC 
As with the steady state welfare case, de…ne the transitional cost of the lower in ‡ation policy as the fraction, + , of the low-in ‡ation regime's consumption that consumers surrender to avoid the transition. That is,
In the current setup, reducing in ‡ation is potentially harmful because it requires lowering real economic activity, which is achieved through an initial surge in interest rates with an unpleasant decline in consumption. Hence from the perspective of an economy with low in ‡ation a positive value of + indicates that households are better o¤ by not facing the transitional trajectory from high to low in ‡ation, i.e., they must be compensated to face the de ‡ationary path. Using equations (7) and (8), we conclude that the total cost of high in ‡ation is = ss + + . Under the convention previously discussed, positive values of indicate that in ‡ation is indeed costly.
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Before ‡eshing out the results, we must decide the values for the high and low steady state in ‡ation rates. Two factors are decisive in selecting the low in ‡ation rate. First of all, note that steady state in ‡ation is an estimated parameter in the model. Furthermore, welfare will be computed using the low in ‡ation regime as the reference point. Therefore, I set L to 2%, the value reported in Table 2 , in an attempt to keep consistency between the estimation and welfare parts of the model. The high in ‡ation rate is 12%, a number that will make the results comparable to those in the related literature (Ireland, 1997 , Lucas, 2000 , and Cooley and Hansen, 1989).
Results
To estimate the e¤ects of in ‡ation in the model, suppose that the economy is initially in a steady state with an annual in ‡ation of 12 percentage points. At time t = 0 the central bank fully commits to bringing in ‡ation down to 2%. Table 3 reports the steady state, transitional, and total annualized costs from the de ‡ationary exercise. The …rst row presents the results when welfare is computed using the median estimates reported in Table 2 . The welfare estimates indicate that 10 percentage points of in ‡ation entail a steady state cost, ss , equivalent to 13:3% of annual consumption. Using the ratio of consumption to output in the steady state, we …nd that the cost of in ‡ation represents 6:8% of annual income. 10 This result is substantially larger than that reported in Lucas (2000). As we shall see in the next section, frictions such as habit formation and price stickiness explain the di¤erence between the results here and in Lucas.
When we turn to the transitional path, we note that the change from the high-to the low-in ‡ation environment imposes a signi…cant burden on households, + , which roughly amounts to 0:53% of annual consumption. The positive sign indicates that households give up consumption to avoid the de ‡ationary path (see previous section). To understand this …nding, recall that reducing in ‡ation requires lowering real economic activity, which 9 To get a description of the transitional dynamics, I use a second-order perturbation algorithm to evaluate V + (see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2004, and Judd, 1998). The approximation is done about the low-in ‡ation steady state. I compute V + using the di¤erence between the high-and low-in ‡ation states as the initial condition for the transitional path. 10 The ratio of consumption to output in steady state equals 0:51 in the model.
is achieved through an initial surge in interest rates. Because of the presence of real and nominal frictions, this spike in turn induces a persistent decline in economic activity, in particular in consumption. The transitional welfare loss results from the (unpleasantly) large and persistent contraction in consumption associated with the recessionary monetary policy. Unlike as in Ireland (1997) , the transitional cost here is only a modest fraction of the steady state welfare gain. It may be tempting to contrast our results, but we must note that such a comparison is not straightforward, since our models di¤er along several dimensions. To name a few: 1) my formulation has capital accumulation, while Ireland's does not; and 2) his price setting mechanism is a mixture of time-and state-dependent formulation, whereas in my work it is solely time-dependent. The impulse responses (solid lines) in Figure 1 con…rm the contractional e¤ects of pushing the economy to the low-in ‡ation state. These impulse responses are computed using the median of the posterior distributions. 11 The new policy successfully brings in ‡ation down to 2%; at the same time, the interest rate initially rises to near 15%, but, as in ‡ation retreats, interest rates converge to its new steady state of 5%. The surge in interest rates makes working capital (W t L t R t ) expensive, which discourages production. Note, however, that as in ‡ation declines, so does price dispersion. Eventually, this second force takes over and contributes to the recovery of output (equation 5), which ends up in a higher steady state. Consumption reaches its lowest level, 2:7%, about 2 quarters after the adoption of the new policy. The contraction in output reduces the demand for labor and hence increases leisure along the de ‡ationary path. Its surge helps to make the transition less costly because leisure is part of the welfare criterion (equation 6). Finally, the model predicts that it takes less than 20 quarters for most variables to converge to the new steady state (notable exceptions are consumption and real wages). This convergence seems consistent with the evidence from Volcker's de ‡ationary era. (It took roughly from 1981 to 1985 for the U.S. in ‡ation to fall from 11% to a value below 4%.) The steady state and transitional results indicate that an in ‡ation of 12%, relative to an equilibrium with 2%, entails a welfare cost of 13:9% of annual consumption or 7% of annual income. A way to understand this total welfare e¤ect is as follows. Imagine that households initially live in an economy with an in ‡ation of 2% per year. Suddenly, they …nd themselves in a new situation in which in ‡ation is 10 percentage points higher. Now households are worse o¤ for two reasons. First, steady state consumption is lower than before, and holding real balances is more expensive due to higher interest rates. Second, if household would like to return to their initial situation with low in ‡ation, they have to endure a transitional path, which from the perspective of the low-in ‡ation steady state looks like a recession. The …rst e¤ect is captured by ss while + measures the impact of the second force.
Although our steady state welfare estimate (13:3%) looks out of touch with the results in Cooley and Hansen (1989) and Lucas (2000) , it is consistent with the …ndings in a recent paper by Aruoba and Schorfheide (2008) . Indeed, these later authors …nd that 10 percentage points of in ‡ation can represent as much as 16% of annual consumption. Yet our welfare estimates are still large relative to those in the sticky-price formulation pursued in Ireland (1997) . Hence it seems necessary to assess whether the additional nominal/real frictions in the model drive the di¤erent welfare estimates.
Role of Frictions
In the experiments to follow, one of the estimated parameters in the benchmark formulation will be …xed at a time while the remaining ones are re-estimated. The welfare numbers are based on the median of the new posterior distributions.
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005) argue that partial price indexation induces signi…cant price dispersion in DSGE models. With partial indexation, inactive …rms cannot fully incorporate changes in past in ‡ation, since prices are adjusted according to P i;t = ( t 1 ) P i;t 1 . Hence, once a …rm happens to re-optimize, it does so aggressively to keep up with future in ‡ation. High in ‡ation and low price indexation (low ) induce stronger price revisions by active …rms, leading to substantial price dispersion. But equation (5) shows that as price dispersion increase, output declines, which is potentially welfare reducing. Figure 3 illustrates this interaction between in ‡ation and indexation and their e¤ects on steady state consumption and output.
To fully characterize the e¤ects of indexation, the second row in Table 3 reports the welfare results when and w are set to 1. Full price/wage indexation drives down the steady state welfare cost by a factor of 4. Indeed, the welfare cost is equivalent to 1:70% (3:32 0:51) of annual output, which is surprisingly close to the welfare cost reported in the stickyprice model of Ireland (1997) . This …nding stresses the importance of a better understanding of the mechanisms behind price setting at the micro level. In terms of the transitional path, we observe that full indexation ampli…es the dynamic welfare e¤ect, although by a small margin. As shown in Figure 1 , this increase results from the strong decline in real balances following the de ‡ationary shock.
Lucas (2000) emphasizes the crucial role of the elasticity of money demand for welfare analysis. Indeed, he …nds that a small elasticity is typically associated with negligible welfare costs of in ‡ation. To assess the implications of Lucas'observation in the context of DSGE models, I re-estimate the model setting the parameter m such that the implied long-run semi-elasticity matches that of CEE, 1 (a value 10 times smaller than in the baseline case). By shrinking m we are e¤ectively reducing the area underneath the demand for money curve. Bailey's (1956) theory in turn suggests that in ‡ation should become less costly with the reduced elasticity. Accordingly, the results in Table 3 show that the welfare cost in the steady state is roughly two-thirds of that under the benchmark formulation. This …nding concurs with those of Lucas but it also highlights the fact that other frictions, such as price indexation or price stickiness, play an even more important role in the welfare calculations.
The results in Table 3 indicate that if habit formation vanishes (b = 0), the steady state cost is smaller than in the benchmark scenario. To understand this …nding, note that steady state real balances, m, and marginal utility of consumption, , are given by
Clearly as habit formation declines, so does the marginal utility of consumption. To compensate for the lost utility, households substitute consumption with real money balances. Since in ‡ation acts as a tax on real balances, households have a stronger desire for real balances in the low in ‡ation environment. Therefore, the substitution e¤ect is larger in the low-in ‡ation scenario, i.e., @m H =@b < @m L =@b. These arguments in turn indicate that the di¤erence between utility from money in the low and high states,
, is increasing in habit formation. But this di¤erence is precisely what matters for steady state welfare comparisons (equations 6 and 7). Hence the lower habit formation is, the lower the steady state welfare costs of in ‡ation.
Notice that the transitional welfare cost almost disappears in the absence of habit formation. This …nding is the product of two forces. First, smaller habit formation makes consumption more ‡exible, allowing it to quickly adjust to the new steady state. Second, households heavily substitute consumption with leisure when habit formation is low (an explanation along the lines of the previous paragraph applies). This intuition is readily con…rmed by the impulse responses reported in Figure 1 . The strong substitution toward leisure is apparent from the large decline in labor. Furthermore, consumption converges relatively fast to its pre-shock steady state. In the benchmark scenario, consumption is still far away from its steady state even …ve years after the shock. Table 3 shows that price ‡exibility makes the welfare cost of in ‡ation decline in the steady state as well as (in absolute value) during the transition. As previously argued, the absence of sticky price contracts completely eliminates price distortions; …rms can freely adjust prices every period, which increases output and hence decreases the bene…ts of a lowin ‡ation environment. In fact, the welfare cost without sticky prices is almost identical to that computed with full price indexation. Figure 2 depicts the transitional responses in the absence of sticky prices (dashed line). Relative to the baseline formulation, we note two main features: 1) consumption, output, and investment are less responsive, and 2) all variables converge more quickly to the new steady state. For example, in ‡ation falls below 4 percent 5 quarters after the monetary shock, which is 2 quarters faster than in the benchmark case.
When we eliminate all real/nominal frictions in the model, the steady state in ‡ation entails a modest welfare loss of 0:22% of annual consumption (0:1% of annual income). Recall that in a frictionless economy, in ‡ation is solely costly due to its tax implications, as in Bailey (1956) . Therefore, it is not surprising that the welfare estimates are more in line with the …ndings of Lucas (2000), who argues that in ‡ation is welfare reducing solely due to its e¤ects on money demand. Figure 2 (starred lines) show that in ‡ation adjusts to its new steady state without any real e¤ect on the economy, resulting in the nil welfare cost during the transition reported in Table 3 . Put di¤erently, in the absence of frictions, the model displays Modigliani's (1963) real dichotomy, which explains the costless de ‡ationary path.
In DSGE models, the Taylor rule is a parsimonious characterization of the central bank's views about the short-run dynamics of in ‡ation and output. Hence the shape of the Taylor rule may 1) in ‡uence the model's high frequency properties; and 2) potentially a¤ect the estimation of the model, leading to distinct welfare orderings. Therefore, a natural exercise is to investigate the e¤ects (if any) that alternative Taylor rules have on the welfare implications of in ‡ation. Let us consider the case in which the central bank's systematic response to in ‡ation is …xed to a counterfactually low number, say, = 1:25 (as with the previous experiments, the rest of the parameters were re-estimated). The results in Table 3 indicate that the welfare cost of in ‡ation in steady state declines, while that during the transition jumps up. The overall e¤ect is a decline in the welfare estimate relative to that under the benchmark formulation. To understand this …nding, note that …xing the Taylor parameter results in a lower estimated Calvo probability for prices, = 0:6; i.e., price contracts are reviewed more frequently. 12 As previously argued, less price stickiness reduces price dispersion, which ultimately lowers the bene…ts of living in low-in ‡ation environments. If one repeats the previous exercise but with a large response to in ‡ation, = 2:5, the welfare cost of 10 percentage points of in ‡ation substantially increases in the steady state. Indeed, it now entails a whopping cost equivalent to almost 41% of annual consumption! A careful analysis of the parameter estimates indicates that this surge results entirely from larger estimated price stickiness, = 0:76, and lower price and wage indexation, = 0:35 and w = 0:54 (see previous footnote). These new estimates exacerbate price dispersion, which makes in ‡ation more costly. Indeed, if we use the Calvo and indexation parameters from the benchmark estimation, the steady state welfare cost declines to 16%. For completeness, Figure 2 presents the impulse responses following the contractionary monetary policy for the low and high response to in ‡ation in the Taylor rule.
The last two paragraphs highlight the crucial role of the Taylor rule in determining the welfare implications of in ‡ation. Note how a misspeci…ed Taylor rule can easily lead to misleading welfare comparisons. As a consequence, we need to reconsider whether for welfare analysis the use of a Taylor rule is an appropriate choice for the pre-Greenspan era. This reconsideration is further granted by the …ndings in Sims and Zha (2006) , who suggest that using a money growth rule may be better capture the thinking of policymakers in the 1960s and 1970s.
To conclude this section, it is worth brie ‡y mentioning the role of parameter uncertainty. The 90% probability intervals reported in Table 3 indicate that this type of uncertainty primarily a¤ects the steady state welfare estimates. In fact, the upper bound of the welfare cost can be as high as 49 percentage points of annual consumption in the baseline model. The results in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that uncertainty about the sticky price parameter, , and price indexation, , drive the large probability intervals associated with welfare. Note that when those frictions vanish, the 90% probability intervals for welfare shrink by a signi…cant amount. This situation does not happen if we suppress, for example, habit formation.
Conclusion
What is the welfare cost of in ‡ation? How much should society give up to live in a lowin ‡ation environment? Answering these questions has been a major endeavor in economics for the past half century. This paper has revisited those questions but from the perspective of an estimated New Keynesian model. According to the benchmark model, which entertains real and nominal frictions, 10 percentage points of in ‡ation entail a total welfare cost of 13:9% of annual consumption (7% in annual output). From the point of view of a policymaker, this result suggests that environments with low in ‡ation are desirable. The result is even more appealing for it comes from the type of models now being used for policy analysis around the world.
A second important contribution of this paper is the analysis of the di¤erent frictions on both the static and dynamic welfare costs of in ‡ation. The results indicate that price in ‡ex-ibility increases the transitional welfare cost by roughly 0:30 percentage point. Furthermore, the shape of the Taylor rule and price indexation are crucial components for welfare analysis in the steady state as well as during the transition. These …ndings call for a better understanding of the microfoundations behind price setting and its interaction with monetary policy as captured by the Taylor rule. At stake is whether in ‡ation imposes a large burden on society.
As in Levin et al. (2005) , I …nd that parameter uncertainty does indeed in ‡uence our inference of the welfare costs, in particular those of in ‡ation. As a consequence, the results in this paper suggest that parameter uncertainty must be incorporated into policy analysis to have a better understanding of the welfare costs of de ‡ations.
Appendix A: Money Demand Equation
Active households in the money market set their real balances according to the program
The presence of the terms g t+ t+ is a consequence of the rule of thumb followed by inactive households (non-optimizing households). This is so because a household given the option to reoptimize money balances must take into account that with positive probability it may not reoptimize ever again. Taking derivatives with respect to M i;t we arrive at the following …rst-order
Next, re-write the …rst-order condition as a restriction on money holdings, M t , which requires that the expected marginal bene…t of an extra dollar equals its expected marginal cost, i.e.,
:
After some tedious algebraic manipulations these last equations collapse to
Given the complete market assumption, the fraction (1 m ) of households re-optimizing money holdings today chooses the same level, M t , governed by equation (10) . Moreover, the random nature of the Calvo lottery implies that inactive households in this period have on average the same money levels as yesterday, M t 1 , adjusted by technology growth and in ‡ation. Hence, aggregate money balances, M t , result from the combination of both active and inactive money:
Let e t = t S t and m t = Mt S t Pt , then the aggregate equation (11) 
In the short term, contemporaneous changes in interest rates, R t , a¤ect aggregate money holdings, M t , only through its in ‡uence on active households in the …nancial market; i.e., those who re-optimize money balances today, M t . This observation in turn implies that the short-term elasticity of money demand is E SR = @ log mt @Rt
. Finally, optimizing households understand that 1) the change in interest rates is permanent, and 2) they may not re-optimize real balances ever again. Hence, households who re-optimize at time t adjust their real balances to the new steady state, i.e., 
P
) and the acceptance ratio, r, is computed r = p(Y T je ')p(e ') p(Y T je ' (n 1) )p(e ' (n 1) ) :The new draw e ' is kept with probability min(r; 1) and rejected otherwise. To characterize the variance of the jumping distribution, c 2 o P , I proceed as follows. First, I apply Christopher Sims' csminwel code to compute the mode of the posterior distribution. To that end, 1000 draws from the prior distribution were used to calculate the posterior. The 10 draws achieving the highest posteriors are the initial points for Sims'minimization algorithm. Second, after checking that the algorithm delivers similar modes, at least for three di¤erent initial conditions, I compute the inverse Hessian at the mode and use it as variance of the jumping distribution. Third, the constant c o is set to achieve an acceptance rate close to 0:35, a value typically suggested in the literature (Casella and Roberts, 2004) .
To check convergence of the resulting algorithm, I run three separate chains, each starting from a di¤erent random draw of the jumping distribution centered at the mode. The medians of the resulting chains lie within 2% of each other. To further con…rm convergence, I compute the potential scale reduction factors, which were less than 1.005. Notes: IG~Inverse Gamma, B~Beta, N~Normal, G~Gamma
Mean and Standard Deviation in square brackets
All measurement errors have priors as described by error 
